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The Supreme Court
POLICE POWER; MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE.
of the United States has recently decided that a city ordinance
providing that no person shall make any public address in any
public grounds of the city, except in accordance with a permit
from the mayor, does not violate the fourteenth amendment to the
Constitution of the United States : Davis v. Co1. of Mass., 17 S.
C. Rep. 731, (May 10, 1897). The question of the right to regulate
public addresses, parades, assemblages, etc., has been treated in any
but a uniform manner by the Supreme Courts of the States. The
difficulty seems to be not so much the right of the State or city to
regulate such rights but the manner in which said rights shall be

regulated and the right to delegate the power to administrative
officers. In Massachusetts, in the above case, and also in Com. v.
Abraham, 156 Mass. 57 (1892), such a delegation of power to the
park commissioners was held to be reasonable and the ordinance
constitutional. In New York it was held, Vance v. Hadfteld, 22
N. Y. S. R. 858; 51 Hun, 620, 643; 4 N. Y. Supp. 112 (1889),
that an ordinance forbidding beating of drums or making any noise
with any instrument whatever on any sidewalk, without written
permission of the president of the village, is reasonable delegation
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of police power. In California, hi re -Flaherty, 105 Cal. 558
(1895), an ordinance making it unlawful to beat a drum upon any
traveled street without special permit, and giving a city officer power
to grant permission, is reasonable delegation of power.
On the other hand, in Wisconsin, State v. Dering, 84 Wis. 585
(1893), it was held that an ordinance forbidding street parades,
beating drums, etc., on certain streets without written permission
of the mayor, but excepting from its provisions certain classes of
organizations, is unreasonable and unconstitutional in giving to the
mayor arbitrary power. And in Michigan, hin re Frazer, 63 Mich.
396 (1886), a similar ordinance was declared to be unreasonable
and void. So, in Oklahoma, In re Griblen, 47 Pac. Rep. 1074
(I897).
So, in Illinois, Chicago v. Trofter, 136 Ill. 430 (1891), an
ordinance providing that no street parade shall be allowed upon
certain streets without permit from police department specifying
routes, etc., is unreasonable and unconstitutional, as council cannot
delegate its legislative power to a mere executive officer.
It would seem that the decision of the United States Supreme
Court is based upon sound law and common sense. Citizens have
certain absolute rights, among them free speech and the use of the
highway, but these rights may be abused as well as used, and in
order to prevent abuses and protect the same rights in other citizens,
there should be proper regulations for the exercise of those rights.
When there regulations are made general in their nature so as not
to discriminate for or against any class, and the power to enforce
these regulations is delegated to a proper executive officer, there
would seem to be little ground for objections.
NEGLIGENCE AT RAILROAD

CROSSINGS; IDENTIFICATION.

What

duties do the various courts impose upon a traveler who approaches
a grade crossing on the highway? A late decision of the Circuit
Court of Appeals, Pyle v. Clark et al., 79 Fed. Rep. 744 (March
22, 1897), well illustrates the rule adopted by the Federal courts
on this subject.
In this case the plaintiff, Pyle, was driving in a wagon with his
friend, Wright, when they approached a grade crossing of
the Union Pacific Railway (operated at the time by the defendant,
Clark and others, as receivers). They stopped at some distance
from the track to allow a train to pass, and then drove across,
looking only down the track toward the south. A train came from
the north at a high rate of speed, and without any warning struck
the wagon and injured them both. Suits having been brought,
Wright was allowed to recover, but Pyle was barred from so doing
on the ground of contributory negligence.
In the part of the judgment relating to the action brought against
the railway company by Pyle (the driver of the wagon), Judge
Sanborn lays down the rule which has been uniformly adopted by
the Federal courts: "It is the duty of everyone approaching a
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railroad to look both ways and to listen; and when a diligent use
of the senses would have avoided the injury, failure to use them is,
under ordinary circumstances, contributory negligence, and should
be so declared by the court."
This is evidently adopted from the
language of Justice Field, in R. R.. Co. v. Houston, 95 U. S. 697
(1877), showing that the Federal Judges consider it negligence per
se to omit either to look or to listen.
In Pennsylvania the same rule is applied with the addition that
it is the imperative duty of the traveler to stop before he attempts
to cross the track. Justice Dean, in Gray v. Penna. R2. -R., 172
Pa. 383 (1896), quotes with approval the language of Justice
Mitchell in a previous case: "The rule that a traveler must stop,
look, and listen is an absolute and unbending rule of law."
So
rigidly is this rule applied that the "stop" is construed in its
literal sense, and a "bicycler's stop," which enables the rider to
obtain a fairly clear view of the track has been held insufficient:
Robertson v. Penna. R. -R., i8o Pa. 43 (1897).
In New York
the Pennsylvania rule, that to stop is necessary, has been utterly
discredited: Neudoetyferv. B. H. R. R., 9 App. Div. 66 (1896),
and this State, together with most of the others, follows the rule of
the Federal courts. However, cases in Texas and Georgia have
gone to the other extreme, and decide that no speci*f duties are
imposed upon the traveler, the omission of which will render him
guilty of negligence, but that he must simply use the care to be
expected of an ordinarily prudent man: _. & G. NI. R. R. v.
Dyer (Tex.), 13 S. W. Rep. 377 (1890); R. & D. R. R. v.
Howard (Ga.), 3 S. E. Rep. 426 (I887).
It will be observed that in the case of Pyle v. Clark, su ra, the
court allowed Wright, who was sitting in the wagon with Pyle, to
recover, the reason being that he was not considered to be identified with Pyle so as to be responsible for the latter's contributory
negligence. The repudiation of the doctrine of identification is
now well settled in the Federal courts, all cases on this subject
following Zittle v. Hackett, 116 U. S. 366 (1885).
Likewise,
after a number of shifting decisions, the same is declared to be the
law in all the States of this country except Michigan and Wisconsin, whose courts still apply the rule of identification laid down in
Thoroughgood v. Bryan, 8 C. B. 115 (1849), where a rider in a
private conveyance is injured through the negligence of the driver:
CtUddy v. Hrm, 46 Mich. 596 (1881) ; Otis v. Janesville, 43 Wis.
422 (1879).
CARRIERS;

EXPRESS

FOR NEGLIGENCE.

IESSENGER;

EXEMPTION FROzM

LIABILITY

For the first time, apparently, a Federal court

has been called upon to consider the validity of a contract exempting a railroad company from liability for injuries to an express
messenger arising through the negligence of its servants. In Voight
v. R. R., 79 Fed. 561 (March 29, 1897), the messenger released
the railroad company from liability for negligence. He was injured
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through negligence of the railroad's employees and sued the company. Defendant set up the agreement between the parties. The
Circuit Court for the Southern District of Ohio held the agreement
void as against public policy and allowed a recovery. In reaching
this decision, the court repudiated the decisions in the only cases
that have raised the question in the state courts, viz. : Bates v.
R. R., 147 Mass. 255 (1888) ; osmcr v. R. R., 156 Mass. 5o6
(1892), and Louisville, Etc., R. R. v. AEcefer (Ind.), 44 N. E.
Rep. 796 (1896).
The court placed its decision on two grounds: (i) That though
a railroad company is under no obligation, in its capacity as common
carrier, to receive the plaintiff as a passenger into its baggage cars,
yet when it does receive him into those cars under a special contract,
it is performing the function of a common carrier and the plaintiff
becomes a passenger for hire ; (2) That if plaintiff was a passenger
for hire the contract in ease of the company's liability for negligence
is void, as being contrary to public policy: R. R. Co. v. Lockwood,
17 Wall. 357 (1873)The point, then, in which this decision differs from the three
above quoted, is in holding that the messenger is a passenger, or, to
put the same thought in other words, that the carrier is, as respects
him, a common carrier and not a special carrier. All the cases cited
agree that -R. R. Co. v. Lockwood is a sound decision, but distinguish it on the ground that there the railroad held itself out as a carrier, and also that there was clearly a compensation received by the
carrier for the issuing of so-called free passes to drovers, authorizing them to ride on the trains on which their cattle were carried.
They hold that a railroad cannot be considered a carrier of passengers by baggage cars, that they are places of great danger, and that
if the messenger were there without permission he might be ejected,
and that hence in view of the fact that the railroad granted this special
and unusual privilege, no public policy is transgressed by a stipulation for exemption. It is said in Bales v. R. R., "The contract
did not diminish the liability of the defendant. It left the risk
assumed by the plaintiff in riding in the baggage car what it would
have been without the contract; it only secured him against being
ejected from the car. . .
The question of the right of carriers to
limit their liability for negligence in the discharge of their duty as
carriers by contracts with their customers or passengers in regard
to such duties, does not arise under this contract as construed in
this case.--R. R. v. Lockwood."
In Louisville, Etc., R. R. v. Keefer, the court took the view
that in making such a contract a railroad company is doing something outside the scope of its occupation as a common carrier,
something it is not legally compellable to do, and hence contracts
in the capacity of a special carrier, and may therefore stipulate
against its own negligence without violating any rule of public
policy. In the latter case an analogy was drawn from the cases which
decide that a contract to transport the private cars of a traveling

NOTES.

circus is not the contract of a common carrier: Coup v. Rr'. Co.,
56 Mich. 1i1 (1885); Rj. Co. v. W'allace, 14 C. C. A. 257
(IS95 ).
There has
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; ELEVENTH AMENDMENT.
been, in recent years, a divergence of opinion as to what constitutes a suit against a State within the meaning of the eleventh
amendment to the Constitution of the United States. In Tindalv.
fW'sley, 17 Sup. Court Rep. 770 (May 1o, 1897), the plaintiff,
having bought land from the Commissioners of South Carolina,
brought ejectment against the Secretary of State, who had ousted
him by virtue of his official authority as having charge of all State
property. The defense was that the suit was in effect against the
State, and therefore the Circuit Court had no jurisdiction.
Mr. Justice Harlan, in affirming the judgment for the plaintiff,
relied principally on U. S. v. Lee, io6 U. S. 192 (1892).
That
case decided that where the agents of the United States held the
Arlington Cemetery for the public use of the government, a suit in
ejectment against them was not a suit against the United States,
but only against the individuals as trespassers, and that such an
action was maintainable as it did not conclude the rights of the
United States: Carr v. U. S., 98 U. S. 433 (1878).
In cases arising under the eleventh amendment, the earlier doctrine was that if the State was not a party to the record, the suit
was not against it: Davis v. Gray, 16 Wall. 203 (1872).
This
view has been abandoned, and the test is now whether the State is
substantially interested in the event. In Zotisiana v. Jumel, 107
U. S. 711 (1882) it was held that a mandamus would not lie
against the auditor and treasurer of Louisiana to compel them to
pay bonds of the State, as they were not mere agents, but servants
of the State, and the effect would be to compel the State to perform
its contract. Wherever that would be the effect of a judgment, the
suit is really against the State: Hagood v. Southern, 117 U. S. 52
(1886) ; In re Ayres, 123 U. S. 443 (1887). If the State is an
indispensable party to the record to enable the court to grant relief,
the suit is against the State: Cunnigham v. OMiecon, &'c.R. R.,
109 U. S. 447 (1883).
But a suit in detinue against a treasurer
who levied on the plaintiff's property for non-payment of taxes,
under a void law, is an action against the wrongdoer as an individual, and not against the State: Poindexrterv. Greenhow, 114 U. S.
270 (1884).
And the Circuit Court will restrain a State officer
from executing an unconstitutional statute which violates the contract made by the State with the plaintiff. As no affirmative official
action is there required from the State, through its officers, it is not
a suit against the State : Pennoycr v. AkcConnaaghj', 140 U. S. i
(r89o); h re Tyler, 149 U. S. 164 (1892). So a suit in tort
will lie against an officer who seizes the plaintiff's goods under an
unconstitutional statute: Scottv. Donald, 165 U. S. 58 (1897),
where the defendant, as constable, seized the plaintiff's liquor
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under the South Carolina dispensary law, which was held unconstitutional as far as it affected interstate commerce.
From these cases it will be seen that in determining whether the
suit is to be considered as against the State regard must be had to
the nature of the case as presented by the whole record, not merely
to nominal parties to it. As the plaintiff in the case under discussion is not suing the defendants to enforce specific performance
of a contract by the State, but to recover property wrongfully taken
by the defendants as individuals under color of state authority, the
case falls under the rule of U. S. v. Lee (sipra), and the line of
cases ending in Scott v. Donald (supra).
The judgment in this case only decides the title as between the
plaintiff and the defendant ; and the State, not having submitted
its rights in the case to the determination of the court, is not concluded by that judgment. Therefore as the suit does not affect the
state, it is not a party in interest, and the suit cannot be said to be
against it within the meaning of the eleventh amendment.
MASTER AND SERVANT;

WRONGFUL DISCHARGE:

MEASURE OF

DAMAGES. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin, in the case of
Tickler v. Andrz ifg. CO., 70 N. W. Rep. 292 (Feb. 27, 1897),
decided that a servant wrongfully discharged cannot recover his
expenses in seeking other employment, though the wages so
received have been credited in reduction of damages. The established rule of law governing such cases is that the servant is entitled
to recover his wages for the balance of his term less what he has
made or might have made from some subsequent employment
during the balance of the term, and that he is bound to use due
diligence in seeking such subsequent employment: Chamberlainv.
Alorgan. 68 Pa. 168 (1871) ; Champlain v. Trans Co., 31 Vt.
162 (1858); Perry v. Simpson, Etc., Co., 37 Conn. 520 (1871);
Howard v. Daly, 61 N. Y. 362 (1875) ; Bennett v. Alrton, 46
Minn. i13 (1891). Of course the damages must be limited in any
case to the contract price for the entire term : Bradshawv. Branan,
5 Rich. 465 (1852) ;
/cfDaniel v. Parks, i Ark. 671 (1858).
The discharged servant, primafacie, has a right to recover for the
whole term and the burden of proof is on defendant to show that
plaintiff has not used reasonable diligence to secure employment
elsewhere. What amounts to reasonable diligence is a question of
fact for the jury in any given case: Byrdv. Boyd, 4 McCord (S. C.),
246, (1827); Howardv. Daly (supra).
In the present case the trial court took the view that, as the
master might show, in mitigation of damages, that the servant had
secured other employment, the servant should be credited with
reasonable expenses incurred in seeking new employment. The
Supreme Court reversed the judgment, holding that the manner of
obtaining employment and the place where best it may be obtained
are questions to be decided by the servant himself, and that any
traveling or expenses that he may consider necessary for the purpose
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are matters entirely within the exercise of his own discretion, and
which cannot concern the former employer. The point seems
never to have been raised before.
It might be argued that the ruling of the trial judge is more likely
to secure justice than that of the Supreme Court. To hold that a
discharged servant must use diligence in seeking other employment,
so as to reduce his master's damages, and to hold further that he
cannot be credited with the expense of reasonable efforts to secure
new employment, and cannot even have the question of the reasonableness of such expense submitted to a jury, seems contradictory.
It is commanding a man to use due diligence, and then punishing
him for its exercise by refusing him a credit for expenses incurred
in his attempt to save his master from liability. If the question of
what is reasonable diligence is for the jury, certainly that body
would seem to be competent to determine whether or not the
expenses incurred were proper.
HUSBAND AND WIFE; COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES.

The Court

of Criminal Appeals of Texas, in the case of Miller v. Stale, 40
S. W. Rep. 313 (April 28, 1897), decided that under the Texas
Statute a prosecuting wife is not a competent witness against her
husband for an abortion perpetrated by him prior to their marriage.
The well-known common law rule is that a wife cannot be received
as a witness for or against her husband except in suits between
them or in criminal cases where he is prosecuted for an act of personal violence committed against her.
In the United States, state statutes on the subject universally
exist. The Texas statute reads: "The husband and wife . . .
shall in no case testify against each other, except in a criminal
prosecution, for an offence committed by one against the other :"
Code Cr. Prac., 1895, Arts. 774 and 775. It is practically declaratory of the common law on this point and was rightly construed
according to that law.
The abortion in this case was effected by drugs. If administering
drugs for such a purpose is not an act of personal violence, in
accordance with the rule, of course the evidence was not admissible.
Nor assuming that the offence was one of personal violence would
the evidence be admissible. The crime was not committed against
the defendant's -ult.ebut against, at the time, an unmarried woman.
Neither could she testify as an unmarried woman for she was his
wife at the time she was called to the stand. In other words, in
cases of this kind, the evidence, to be admissible, must be of acts of
personal violence committed by a husband or wife against the other
after marriage: Pedlej, v. T4ellesley, 3 Car. and P. 559 (1829);
State v. Evalls, 39 S. W. (Mo. Sup ) 462 (1897).
But see Corn.
v. Krelger, 17 Co. Ct. Rep. (Pa.) 181 (1896).
The common law restriction on the competency of the husband
or wife as a witness against the other being based on principles of
public policy, statutes purporting to change the rule are construed
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with the greatest strictness. No mere general statutes permitting
all persons to testify regardless of interest affect the marital incapacity. The rule must be changed expressly or by necessary
implication: Dwelly v. Dwell)', 46 Me. 377, 38o (1859) ; Lucas
v.Brooks, I8 Wall. 436, 452 (1873); In re Jones, 6 Biss. 68
(1874) ; Gibson v. Con. 87 Pa. 253 (1878).
The rule as laid
down inthese cases isaccording to the decided weight of authority.
Contra, see Merriam v. Hartford, 20 Conn. 354, 362 (1850);
Berlin v.Berlin, 52 Mo. 151, 153 (1873).
CARRIERS;

WHO IS A PASSENGER.

In Missouri, K.

& T. Rr.

Co. of Texasv. Williams, 40 S. W. 350 (Tex.Civ. App.) (Mar.31,
1897), a person was held a passenger under somewhat novel cir-

cumstances. A boy without a ticket, but with money, and intending,
as he said, to pay fare, climbed on the front platform of an express
car, which the conductor could not reach while the train was in
motion. The boy's excuse for choosing this rather unsuitable place
for boarding the train was that he was late in reaching the station,
and was obliged for his own safety to get on the front end of the first
car which came by him. There was nothing to show that his tardiness was due to any fault of the company.
This exact state of facts seems never before to have been passed
upon judicially. In Perryv. CentralR., 66 Ga. 746 (1879), Perry
had bought a ticket, and was standing near the platform when the
train started. He ran in pursuit and was injured. He was held not
a passenger. See also Webster v. FitchburgR., 161 Mass. 298, 37
N. E. 165 (1894) ; Baltimore Traction Co. v. State, 78 Md. 400,
28 AtI. 397 (1894).
InSharrerv.Paxson, 171 Pa. 26 (1895), it
was decided that a passenger who has safely boarded a moving train
is entitled to all the rights of any other passenger. But in that case
the injured person had gotten on an ordinary passenger coach.
The cases have held for the most part that one boarding a car
manifestly not intended for passengers, and without the invitation,
express or implied, of the company, cannot claim a passenger's
rights: Files v. Boston &- A. R., 149 Mass. 204 (1889) ; Powers
v. Boston &. A..R., 153 Mass. I88 (1891) ; Stringer v. Missoufri
P. R., 96 Mo. 299, 302 (1888) ; Eaton v. Delaware, L. &, W.
R., 57 N.Y. 382 (1874).
Itwould be interesting to speculate on how far the decision inthe
principal case might be carried. It would seem that under it an3,one
with a "bonafide intention" to become a passenger has a wide choice
of places for boarding a train. But the decision is deprived of much
of its weight by the fact that the injury was so wanton that recovery
would have been allowed, even though the injured person had been
a trespasser.
CONTRACTS OF FOREIGN CORPOIATIONS.
The question presented
in Sullivan v. Beck et al., 7o Fed. 200 (1897) is of importance
in every state where foreign corporations are subject to regulations.
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By sections 3453 and 3454, 2 Burns Rev. St. Ind. 1894, an agent
of a foreign corporation is required to register in the county in
which he proposes to do business and to file an order or resolution
of the board of directors authorizing suit to be brought against them
by service of process on him. Section 3o56 (11.) provides that:
"Such foreign corporations shall not enforce, in any court of this
state, any contracts made by their agents or by persons assuming to
act as their agents, before a compliance by such agents or persons
acting as such with the provisions of sections 3453 and 3454 of this
act. "
An agent of the company plaintiff, incorporated under the laws
of Illinois, without complying with the requirements of sections
3453 and 3454 of the above act, executed in Indiana on Sept. 29,
189o a bond and mortgage on real estate. This action was a bill
by the receiver of the company plaintiff to foreclose the mortgage.
The defendants filed a plea in abatement.
It was held by Baker, District Judge, that the contract was valid.
Section 3456 does not purport to invalidate any contract entered
into before compliance with the statutory requirements. The only
inhibition is that it shall not be enforced in the courts of the State
until the requirements are complied with: MAfachine Co. v. Caldwell, 54 Ind. 270 (1876) ; Domestic Co. v. Halfteld, 58 Ind. 187
(1877) ; Daily v. Insurance Co., 64 Ind. I (1878) ; .Afanufacturing Co., v. Brown, Id. 548 (1878) ; Insurance Co. v. Wellman,
69 Ind. 413 (1879) ; Elston v. Piggott, 94 Ind. 14 (1883);
Wies/ling v. Warthin, I Ind. App. 217, 27 N. E. 576 (1891);
Guarantee Co. v. Cox (Ind. Sup.), 42 N. E. 915 (1896).
The
terms of section 3456 refer only to state courts, and are not binding
on the national courts: Hervey v. Railway C., 28 Fed. 169
(1884) ; FarmersLoan &- Trust Co. v. Chicago&- f. P. R. Co.,
68 Fed. 412 (I895). Hence the valid contract, although nonenforceable in the state courts, can be enforced in the Federal
courts. The plea in abatement was therefore insufficient, and leave
was given to answer again.
COVENANTS RUNNING WITH THE LAND; POSSESSION OF GRANTOR;
HUSBAND AND WIFE; IS POSSESSION BY ONE POSSESSION By BOTH?

In M)gat v. Coe (Court of Appeals of New York), 46 N. E.
948 (April 20, 1897) Coe joined ina deed of his wife's separate
real estate, with covenants of warranty and quiet enjoyment. He
had been living on the land in question as head of the family, had
paid the taxes and kept the premises in repair. It was, nevertheless,
held by a divided court (four to three) that the husband was not
in possession and that consequently his covenants did not run with
the land. O'Brien, J., delivering the majority opinion, admitted a
hardship to the plaintiffs but asserted the necessity of adhering to
the old common law rule. There must have been transfer of possession from grantor to grantee, else there could be no land to which
the covenants might be annexed.
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Bartlett, J. (dissenting) said it was " not possible to say that
Coe was a stranger to the title and transferred no estate to which
his covenant of warranty could attach," quoting Finch, J., in
Mygatt v. Coe, 142 N. Y. 86, 36 N. E. 870 (1894).
See also
dissenting opinion of Haight, J., in Mfygatt v. Coe, 147 N. Y. 467
(1895).
The question of how great an interest in the grantor is necessary
to cause the covenants of warranty and quiet enjoyment to run with
the land is historically interesting: zVoke v. Awder, Cro. El. 373,
436 (1594); Bedda&v. Wadsworth, 21 Wend. (N. Y.) 120 (1839);
Slater v. Rawson, I Met. (Mass.) 450 (1840) ; 6 Id. 439 (1843);
Wilson v. Widenham, 51 Me. 566 (1863) ; Dickson v. Desire, 23
Mo. 3i (i856); Fields v. Squires, i Deady (C. C. U. S.) 366,
389 (1868) ; Weadv. Larkin, 49 Ill. 99 (1868); Id. 54 Ill. 489
(1870) ; Rawle on Covenants for Title (sh Ed.) § 203.
The later cases all hold that mere possession in the grantor is
sufficient. The controversy now is what constitutes possession.
The majority of the court in the principal case, after stating that
Coe negotiated the sale, executed a written contract of sale in his
own name and himself received a part of the purchase money, said
that these facts (and the others indicated above) did not show such
interest or possession on the part of the husband as to carry his
covenant down through the line of conveyances to the plaintiff.
"They are all such acts of care, management and agency by the
husband with respect to his wife's property as naturally and necessarily proceed from the relation of husband and wife."
The decision might have been otherwise in some states: Endlich
& Richards on Married Women in Pennsylvania. § 226, seem .to
take the husband's liability on covenants for title in a deed of his
wife's separate property as a matter of course, the only doubt being in
regard to the wife's responsibility. Nothing is said about covenants
running with the land but there seemp no reason why, if the point
should come up, the Pennsylvania courts might not hold the possession of the husband amply sufficient to carry the covenants.
See, as to husband's headship of family and possession of wife's
real estate, Johnson v. Futllerton, 44 Pa. 466 (1863).
For excellent discussions of what constitutes possession in general,
see Williams v. Buchanan, i Iredell's Law (N. C.), 535 (1841) ;
Bynum v. Carter, 4 Iredell's Law (N. C.), 310 (1844) ; Swift v.
Agtnes, 33 Wis. 228, at 240 (1873).

